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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EU1 in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own 
research projects, the Centre works in close relation with the four departments 
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This working paper is concerned with the structure and practice of European 
governance in the environmental field. It situates the current environment- 
specific governance debate in the EU in a larger context of the global discourse 
on governance in general as well as on environmental sustainability. The core of 
the paper deals with the evidence of governance changes on the EU level and in 
four of the member states (Germany, Netherlands, Spain, UK) and explores to 
what extent we are currently witnessing a convergence of environmental 
governance patterns in Europe. The paper concludes that the EU impact on 
national structures and practices exists with respect to the national governance 
rhetoric and certain institutional innovations. Overall, diversity of 
environmental governance patterns is persisting in Europe, which from the 























































































































































































With "the transformation of governance" the literature on European integration 
and policy making is returning to a theme that has preoccupied scholars of the 
European Community since its early days of existence. Early analyses have 
focused on shifting power relations - between different levels of government 
and to a lesser extent with respect to state-society relations - as the primary 
dimension of governance (leading amongst these early works are Haas 1964 
and Hoffmann 1966). In light of an increasingly acute awareness of the 
complexities of the processes, interactive structures and the institutional design 
in Europe, on the one hand, and a rising concern with the problem solving 
capacity of national and supranational governing authorities confronted with 
the complex, diverse and dynamic nature of “modem” policy problems 
(Kooiman 1993), on the other hand, present studies of European governance 
have begun to examine not only the distribution of competencies but also 
modes or practices of governance, including interactive patterns and regulatory 
style and instruments (Jachtenfuchs, Kohler-Koch 1995; Kohler-Koch 1996).
The question is raised whether European policy making in complex policy 
areas is resulting in new structures and modes of governance in the European 
member states. What are the mechanisms and conditions under which new 
notions of governance diffuse in Europe? What constitute the limits to such 
diffusion? These are the questions that are explored in this paper with respect to 
one specific “modem” policy area, namely environmental policy.
European environmental policy represents a regulatory and sector-transgressing 
policy field. Its complex nature and extensive scope, with implications for the 
appropriate role and internal organisation of the state and its governing style, 
place environmental policy in the centre of the present re-evaluation of 
governance models.1 2 The recognition of a considerable implementation gap has 
served to further highlight the limits to govemability (a) in the relationship 
between the EC and the national (implementing) level, (b) across policy sectors
1. Introduction1
1 This paper is currently considered for publication in Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.), 
Transformation o f Governance in the European Union (London: Routledge, ECPR Series, 
forthcoming in late 1997).
1 am grateful to Peter Bursens, Rainer Eising, Markus Jachtenfuchs, Markus Haverland, 
Christoph Knill and Michèle Knodt and all participants in the ECPR workshop meetings in 
Oslo and Mannheim for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
2 See the so-called “Molitor report” for an evaluation of the structure and mode of 



























































































due to failing policy coordination and integration and (c) over time by allowing 
long-term unsustainable practices.
Reflecting upon the widened scope of the governance debate, I will define the 
concept as consisting of two dimensions:
1. structural elements with reference to (a) organisational features (vertical and 
horizontal distribution of responsibilities; that is, centralised versus 
decentralised and integrated versus compartmentalised structures) and (b) state- 
society relations or forms of interest intermediation (that is, the patterns of ex- 
and inclusion, reflected in the authoritarian role of the state versus corporatism 
versus competitive pluralism versus networks/partnership). This dimension 
encapsulates the “traditional” power-related understanding of governance, 
whereas the following one responds to the new emphasis on governing practice.
2. regulatory style: following van Waarden (1995), I distinguish between three 
sub-dimensions, namely (a) the routine intervention modus 
(hierarchical/interventionist versus cooperative), (b) routine procedures 
(legalistic versus flexible/pragmatic; adversarial versus consensual); and (c) 
routinely created policy networks (compared to the structural dimension, this 
category focuses on the nature of the interaction within networks, for instance, 
a formal versus informal style).
A particular choice of policy instruments is related to the respective regulatory 
structure and style and shall be included in the analysis as an indicator of the 
respective mode of governance. In brief, a shift away from command-and- 
control (top-down) policy instruments toward market-oriented, self-regulatory 
and communicative “learning” tools tends to correspond with more open 
governing structures (networks, partnerships) and the adoption of a facilitating, 
cooperative and consensual rather than imposing mode of governance.
The following section begins the exploration by briefly charting the emergence 
of the new governance debate in the global and European discourse. It situates 
the debate on European environmental governance in the ongoing general as 
well as policy specific (environmental) global discourse on governance. The 
purposes of this discussion is merely to elaborate on the features of the ideal- 
typical “new” mode of governance in the environmental area. Even though it is 
my assumption that European governance is embedded and responsive to global 
pressures as well as a global exchange of ideas, the analytical focus of the core 
of this paper is limited to (a) the extent to which such new mode is emerging 
with respect to EC structures and policies and (b) the degree and mechanisms 




























































































European considerations regarding the transformation of environmental 
governance take place in the context of a general and a policy-specific 
governance debate which, I suggest, overlap in the types of governance 
structures and practices that are being identified as governance solutions. To be 
precise, the debate on the general “crisis of the state” and that on failures to 
resolve environmental problems in particular share the perception of a problem 
solving potential implied in a shift from hierarchical to inclusive network 
structures and in the move toward a more cooperative, consensual and 
facilitating governing or regulatory style.
To elaborate briefly on the two concurrent debates, the issue of general 
governance focuses on the loss of problem solving capacity of central 
governments. The perception of crisis goes hand in hand with a broader, more 
systemic understanding of the nature of today’s policy problems and has led to 
several “global responses” to these new concerns, ranging from the “pooling of 
responsibilities” in supra- and international fora to attempts of changing the 
forms of governmental “management” and state-society relations (see Scharpf 
1988, Mayntz 1993). The so-called steering debate (Steuerungsdebatte) - 
reinforced by the concurrent “neo-liberal” economic debate - has triggered 
plans for institutional reforms, targeted at slimming and unburdening the 
central state. These reforms imply changes in governing practices and choice of 
policy instruments, for instance moves toward de-regulation, market 
liberalisation or “new public management” (Hood 1995, Wright 1994).
The evolution of European environmental governance is influenced equally by 
a global debate on the content and structure of environmental policy (WCED 
1987, UNCED 1992). This debate, while focusing on the interpretation of the 
political, socio-economic and scientific reality, has structural - that is 
governance - implications in its own right which currently resonate in EC and 
member state programmatic documents (e.g., the Commission’s Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme (CEC 1993a) and the Dutch National 
Environmental Policy Programme). The emerging recognition of the 
complexity of the policy problématique is implied in a new, systemic 
understanding of the role of environmental protection in economic 
development. Governance failures are identified along two dimensions, one 
touching on intra-state and the other on state-society relations, with 
implications for governance structure, style and instruments:





























































































1. In the past, fragmented policy making structures have led to “insulated” 
environmental and economic governing activities, respectively. This was so 
despite the inherently horizontal nature of the environmental policy field. Such 
insulated structures have prevented effective policy coordination and, 
consequently, have led to sub-optimal policy outcomes across policy fields (i.e., 
failed to minimise the costs inflicted by one policy on the other) and the failure 
to exploit complementary policy objectives (derived from the realisation that 
environmental protection and economic development are mutually dependent 
on one another in the long-term).
2. The traditional assumption that policy objectives may be successfully 
pursued by legally imposing rules and procedures upon societal actors has 
resulted in the predominance of a legalistic, hierarchical policy style, with 
corresponding top-down regulatory policy instruments. Furthermore, it has led 
to the neglect of systematically including a wide spectrum of societal actors in 
policy formulation and implementation. Implementation failures have alerted to 
the fact that environmental protection ultimately depends on changes in attitude 
and hence the behaviour of every member of society. Given the - more and 
more apparent - limits in the problem solving capability of authoritative 
regulation (and technological solutions), policy actors started to experiment 
with a more cooperative, consensual and inclusive policy style that is targeted 
of business actors and ordinary citizens. Their acceptance of environmental 
policy objectives and of their responsibility for the collective (economic and 
environmental) good is now thought crucial for positive policy outcomes. The 
perception that successful policy depends on economic and private actors 
“internalising” the fact that they are responsible for environmental protection 
has further consequences for the choice of policy instruments. It has resulted in 
a de-emphasis of top-down regulatory instruments and the attribution of a more 
prominent role to market-oriented, self-regulatory as well as informational and 
communicative instruments.
It is apparent that the seemingly environment-specific concerns with 
governance structures and style echo the above mentioned general issues 
concerning the overall problem solving capacity of the state. We detect 
“conceptual borrowing” between the general and policy-specific debates. The 
steering debate and the environmental governance debate have led to similar 
calls for a shift from reactive and narrowly conceived policy making to the 
broader attempt at problem solving (Scharpf 1988), the replacement of 
hierarchical state-society relations with network structures formed by a 
negotiating and jointly learning set of actors (Mayntz 1993; Hakansson 1993, 
quoted in Kohler-Koch 1995) and a facilitating and mediating state. The use of 




























































































steering”; similarly market-oriented and self-regulatory instruments may 
represent such an attempt by conferring greater responsibility for the collective 
good to societal actors.3
Having elaborated on the interplay between general and environment specific 
governance in the context of the ongoing global debates, let me now turn to the 
actual emergence of “new” modes of governance in European environmental 
politics. In the following analysis the global debates just discussed move 
“backstage” and the focus shifts to the transformation of governance patterns 
on the EC level and its impact on member state structures and practices. First, I 
“take stock” of the mode of European environmental governance, contrasting it 
to the features of “new” governance identified above. Then, I turn to the 
diffusion of “new” governance structures and style in the EC member states, 
posing the question to what extent and under what conditions the EC example 
is followed in the member states (keeping in mind that each level will have 
been influenced by global developments as well as play a role in shaping the 
global and European processes). A first and still explorative attempt is made to 
trace the EC impact on national transformation processes as well as policy 
performance. Graph 1 serves to highlight the specific focus of this analysis 
(thick arrows) within a complex international institutional and ideational 
context.
3 The latter link depends on the larger context in which these instruments are embedded as 
this shift in policy instruments may also reflect ideas derived from the economic debate on 
neo-liberalism. Such concurrence of debates poses obvious analytical problems which, due to 




























































































Graph 1: The Context of the Transformation of Environmental Governance
Global Debate on Governance
- pooling o f sovereignty + capabilities
- new forms o f "leadership"
- deregulation, liberalisation, etc.




existing governance structure, style, instruments
::
Member State Member State Member State
national structures national structures national structures
In the analysis of the top-down impact of EC governance structures and 
practices on national patterns we can formulate the null-hypothesis that no 
domestic transformation occurs. In contrast, if we detect a convergence toward 
a new mode of governance between the supranational and the national levels I 
suggest to think of this process in terms of a dynamic process of transformation 
pressure exerted on the EC level (necessary condition) and member state 
receptivity (sufficient condition) to these new influences.4
4 Please note, the focus on the influence of EC governance patterns on domestic governance 
reflects a restricted analytical perspective rather than an underlying assumption that global 
impact is insignificant or that no feedback from domestic structures and politics to EC 
practices occurs. A systematic analysis of the interplay between the three levels of analysis 




























































































I suggest that European pressure to transform develops in two ways. First, the 
emergence of governance structures creates a reform agenda and structures the 
range of reform alternatives considered on the national level. Newly created 
European “governance models” that, in addition, amplify and crystallise new 
notions of governance emerging in the global debates, serve as the basis for 
national learning processes. I hypothesise that such top-down trickle effect 
depends first and foremost on the institutionalisation and internal consistency 
of the European example, encompassing a clear perception of the policy 
problem and a corresponding model for governance structures and practices 
thought capable of problem solving. Secondly, in addition to structuring the 
flow of ideas and policy concepts in the member states, EU influence may 
result more directly from European legislation to be implemented on the 
national level. To the extent that EC directives and regulations imply certain 
new governance structures and styles (e.g., the self-regulatory style implied in 
the Eco-Audit Regulation or the emphasis on transparency in the Access to 
Environmental Information Directive), transformation pressure on national 
actors is exerted in the implementation process.
Receptivity, I argue, depends similarly on ideational and institutional factors. I 
suggested above that new governance concepts have emerged from a new 
awareness of insufficient problem solving capacity. Such shift in perception, in 
turn, resulted from a new problem definition (on a general level this concerns 
the complexity, dynamic and diversity of “modem” policy issues; in the case of 
the environment, its inter-sectoral, inter-generational and societal dimensions 
are newly perceived as core problems). This link between problem perception 
and receptivity to governance reform is not a uniform process across member 
states, however. Instead, the adoption of the “new” problem definition is likely 
to vary depending on the national context, affecting the member states’ drive to 
engage in governance reforms (for a similar reasoning see Haas 1990 and 
Jachtenfuchs 1996). The move from ideational adaptation to governance 
transformation is further influenced by institutional resistance to change. In Di 
Maggio and Powell’s words “[ijnstitutional models are quite unlikely to be 
imported wholeclothed into systems that are very different from which they 
originate” (1991: 29). Hence, we expect “proposals” for new modes of 
governance in the European or global arena to be re-interpreted in the given 
national context whereby member states’ receptivity depends on the gap 
between “new” (European) and already existing domestic patterns as well as the 




























































































3. New Modes o f Governance in European Environmental Policy Making 
3.1. The EC Level
On the EC level there is evidence that the wider and more systemic 
environmental problem perceptions that is being formulated in global 
environmental fora are taking root. The associated new structures, style and 
instruments of governance are equally gaining currency on the Brussels level of 
European environmental policy making. This section shows that presently they 
supplement rather than replace traditional governance structures. In other 
words, Europe is sending “mixed signals” - a factor that is likely to reduce the 
level of transformation pressure created for the member states.
Environmental policy in the EC began as an opportunistic policy in the 1960s, 
exploiting policy niches “unclaimed” in the established policy areas on the 
European level and relatively non-controversial or non-politicised among 
member states. In Hildebrand’s words, this early European environmental 
policy, which was then lacking a formal legitimisation in the EC’s Treaty-basis, 
was “incidental to the overriding economic objectives” (Hildebrand 1993: 13). 
In the 1970s and early ‘80s it became increasingly “responsive” to a greening 
public opinion (spumed by concrete environmental disasters) and the 
realisation of the often transnational effects of pollution (ibid.: 20-28).
Even though several policy principles were proclaimed in the first European 
Environmental Action Programmes, such as the principles of prevention, 
polluter pays and policy integration, in reality these principles were 
compromised, and no distinct policy philosophy or general problem perception 
supported by a coherent governance structure emerged on the European level. 
Nevertheless, especially in contrast to the new mode of governance sketched 
above, several general features of early EC environmental policy can be 
detected.
1. The nature of the problem solving problematiaue in environmental policy 
remained elusive, hindering the emergence of coherent governance structures. 
The EC’s ad hoc creation of environmental policy, resulting in a policy 
patchwork rather than an integrated system, played an important role in this 
respect. In part due to the very restrictive opportunity structure for systemic 
environmental policy making (c.f., Knill/Heritier 1996, Lenschow 1996) 
environmental policy emerged in those “niches” that were non-controversial 
among member states or had escaped political attention. This was reinforced by 
the EC’s legal structures which did not provide an explicit legal base for 
environmental policy. Thus, environmental measures were placed primarily in 




























































































regulating liberalised market processes) and benefits (through the 
harmonisation of standards) for the market.
2. The largely vertical structure of Community institutions led to limited 
interaction between horizontal policy fields (such as the environment) and 
sectoral ones and intensified the patchwork character of the set of ideas guiding 
EC environmental policy (Lenschow 1996). The European policy level was 
perceived as the top layer in the policy making chain. The formal (legal 
transposition) rather than practical implementation of EC legislation was the 
primary concern of EC-level “guardians” in the Commission, hence 
coordination with the implementing national or regional level was low. 
Furthermore, the ad hoc style in policy "appropriation" hindered a systematic 
division and coordination of responsibilities along vertical and horizontal lines. 
In terms of state-society relations a clear structure of interest intermediation on 
the European level could not be detected; its characteristics are fluctuating 
between corporatist and pluralist patterns.
3. On the basis of this formal structure in environmental policy making, an 
interventionist and legalistic policy style developed. Access for societal actors 
tended to be nevertheless informal, though favouring economic interests, with 
tri- or multi-lateral partnerships forming an exception. The network structures 
that emerged around the Commission operated merely in the early policy 
formulation phase, hence performed as an instrumental device for the 
Commission. They were short-term in their impact and did not represent 
elements of a new mode of governance based on cooperative partnerships 
shaping the entire policy making process. Nevertheless, the policy formulation 
phase was relatively consensual which served to reduce the level of conflict in 
the subsequent competitive decision making phase.
4. Corresponding to the interventionist and legalistic style, EC social 
regulations are traditionally command-and-control measures, establishing 
material or procedural standards to be followed in the member states. To this 
day the EC has adopted more than 200 binding pieces of environmental 
legislation (Haigh 1990).
Since the mid 1980s, the EC has slowly departed from this traditional pattern of 
governance in the environmental policy field. Past implementation problems 
had alerted policy makers to the insufficient problem solving capacity of the 
system and triggered a debate on policy and institutional reform. On the basis 
of the globally emerging new understanding that environmental protection 
constitutes the basis for economic development, the governance problem 




























































































Treaty on European Union (TEU) lays down that “[environmental protection 
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other 
Community policies” (TEU, Art. 130r,2), strengthening the formulation chosen 
in the SEA. Policy integration represents the central message in the latest EC 
Environmental Action Programme (CEC 1993a) and is considered the 
structural requirement for realising the complementary nature of economic and 
environmental policy goals. This notion also features in programmatic 
publications of the Commission such as its White Paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness, Employment (CEC 1994) or its recent Communication on 
Trade and Environment (CEC 1996a).
Recent institutional and procedural innovations by the Commission reveal its 
attempt to adjust governance structures to the new problem perception. For this 
purpose horizontal policy boundaries are loosened and networks spun to 
connect public authorities and society. These networks reach beyond the 
existing policy-specific networks and focus beyond the immediate and narrow 
policy formulation stage. To be specific, three dialogue groups were 
established: A consultative forum included representatives of regional and local 
authorities (4 members), consumer and environmental organisations (5), trade 
unions (2), industry (9), agriculture and agri-food organisations (2) and 
independent personalities (9) and provided a general sound-board on the 
general direction of EC environmental policy and its relation to economic 
development. An implementation network consisted of Commission officials 
and representatives of relevant national authorities involved in the 
implementation of EC policy. Finally, a policy review group, composed of the 
environmental Director-Generals in the member states and Commission 
officials, aimed at developing a mutual, cross-national understanding and the 
exchange of views and information on environmental policy and specific 
measures.
Indicating an emerging belief in policy integration and the problems inherent in 
organisational fragmentation and insulation, the Commission began to engage 
in internal administrative and procedural reforms as well. In an internal 
Communication (CEC 1993b) the Commission announced to
• clarify ‘the mechanisms for internal consultation, in particular to stress that 
the services responsible for environmental policies in the Commission are 
consulted at the early stages of definition of Community policy and action’;




























































































• strengthen its internal mechanisms by (a) preparing an annual integration 
report based on self-evaluation of all DGs of their performance, (b) designating 
in each DG a senior official to the task of ensuring that policy and legislative 
proposals prepared in that DG take account of the environment, (c) establish a 
special unit in DGXI with the task of coordinating and monitoring the 
implementation of the fifth EAP;
• communicate its integration efforts through the annual work programme and 
the annual report and prepare a code of conduct for its own practices.
Also, the Commission as a whole has announced a number of measures 
designed to enhance the transparency of its work. The package includes the 
earlier publication of the Commission’s annual work plan in order to allow for 
more effective discussion with the other institutions and potential revisions, 
more structured procedures and broader consultation with affected interests and 
a code of conduct on access to information supported by technological 
innovation (Peterson 1995).
The implications for governance of these internal changes, once completed, are 
two-fold. First, they are intended to improve the legitimacy and accountability 
of the Commission in the area of environmental policy through the adoption of 
self-regulating measures and a higher level of transparency, in the absence of 
democratic controls. Second, in order to facilitate systemic/sustainable policy 
making, they constitute an attempt to break down boundaries between policy 
areas, so prevalent on the EC level, and broaden as well as deepen 
communication channels between previously insulated policy makers.
Other Commission initiatives to surmount fragmented communication involve 
links to civil society. DGXI in particular has stepped up its efforts to create 
such links, developing its own support network beneath the public authorities 
in the member states but also enabling societal actors to play a greater role in 
policy making on the domestic and EC level. In addition to lending financial 
support to the operation of several Europe-wide environmental organisations, a 
process defining the relations between the Commission and European interest 
federations also with respect to other policy areas and as such not a new 
characteristic, the Commission engages in regular - increasingly high-level - 
contacts with interest groups. “New” funding goes to specific NGO projects 
that are targeted at developing and mobilising an environmentally concerned 
element in civil society within the member states as well as outside EC territory 
(e.g. in Eastern Europe). Through financial support, consultation services and 
the facilitation of cross-national exchange of information and cooperation, the 




























































































‘European Partners for the Environment’ (providing a platform of industry and 
NGOs to meet and discuss ways toward sustainable development) and the ‘Car 
Free Cities Club,’ thereby facilitating the development of a mutual 
understanding among segments of society and, in the long run, attitude changes 
among societal actors.
Similarly challenging the traditionally legalistic, command-and-control 
approach to environmental policy making has been a shift in the choice of 
policy instruments. “New instruments” are targeted at improving the amount 
and quality of information (data collection, research), the consideration of 
spatial and temporal environmental impact (spatial planning, environmental 
impact assessments, integrated pollution control), the goal to integrate policy 
objectives by “getting the prices right” (economic analysis and instruments), 
and to change producers’ and consumers’ attitudes and hence behaviour 
(education, training, information, incentives). The new European 
Environmental Agency plays a central role in supporting and coordinating these 
efforts. In general, these new instruments and institutional innovations will 
perform the function of facilitating problem recognition and resolution, instead 
of imposing a diagnosis and prescriptions from above. The emphasis on 
information collection and provision, research and education help the creation 
of equal partnership in policy making, their joint learning but also mutual 
control. The plurality of actors associated with the different instruments will 
result in new complexity in territorial and public-private terms, counter-acting 
old hierarchical chains of command.
Despite the impression of a significant transformation of governance in the EC, 
it must be emphasised that the innovations just described are taking place as 
"extensions" rather than replacements for traditional structures, styles and 
instruments. The integrative structures continue to be weak and often 
ineffectual due to the persistence of horizontal and vertical policy divides; 
similarly the new formal networks created after the adoption of the 5th EAP 
have not yet emerged as main contributors in the policy making process (CEC 
1995b, Favoino 1997, Lenschow 1996). On the other hand, many issue-specific 
policy networks are forming and begin to play an important role for the 
Commission’s work as well as national policy making practices (Interviews 
Bundesministerium fur Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (BMU), 
March 1997). With respect to new policy instruments, command-and-control 
legislation continue to out-numbers the existence of new instruments by far.5
5 No normative judgement is implied in this statement. It may very well be, that command- 
and-control instruments are superior in reaching environmental objectives compared to 




























































































From the perspective of the level of institutionalisation of new governance 
structures on the EC level it may be revealing to briefly examine the position of 
the Court with regard to the new problem perception and the associated 
governance structures.6 The Court has been instrumental in legitimising EC 
environmental policy making. It has not succeeded in clarifying the connection 
between environmental and economic objectives (Koppen 1992) and, on this 
shaky ground, considers environmental issues on a case-by-case basis. This 
way the Court has contributed to the perpetuation of fragmented governance 
structures, an adversarial rather than consensual patterns of conflict resolution 
and exclusive network structures. For instance, by resisting a broad definition 
of “access to justice” in limiting the right of environmental organisations to 
legally pursue non-compliance with EC environmental law (admissibility to the 
Court is premised on a violation of individual rights), the Court has restricted 
the establishment of more open governance structures and practices.
In conclusion, while a shift in the policy discourse is quite apparent especially 
within the Commission, neither the impact of organisational and procedural 
innovations, the shift towards new policy instruments, nor the “constitutional” 
status of new governance elements are unambiguous. Rather, the present status 
of EC environmental policy must be characterised as a mix of old and new 
policy philosophies, structures, style and instruments. To the extent that we 
observe a trend toward new practices, such trend is presently most prevalent in 
DGXI and the Environment Committee in the European Parliament. From the 
analytical perspective of this paper, the necessary condition for a 
transformation of governance in the member states - EC pressure - is not clearly 
satisfied, even though a trend can be identified.
3.2. The member states
As just concluded, based on the discussion of the governance pattern on the EC 
level, the overall transformation pressure is only moderate. What has been a 
mix of governance features from the start has now become a “wider mix” 
through the addition of new elements. The diffusion of these new elements is 
nevertheless worthwhile analysing.
For this purpose I examine the experiences in Germany, The Netherlands, Spain 
and the UK. They represent a wide spectrum of national governance traditions
hâve pointed out the limits of self-regulatory measures in particular (e.g., Hajer 1992, Liibbe- 
Wolff 1996, Scharpf 1992, van der Straaten AJgelow 1994, Weidner 1997).
6 Weiler in particular has emphasised in his work that the Court’s rulings have had a 




























































































in general, and specifically with respect to environmental policy (c.f., 
Badie/Bimbaum 1983, Dyson 1980 and 1992, Knill 1995, van Waarden 1995), 
hence we can expect to gain some insight in the patterns of national responses 
to EC transformation pressure.
Before turning to transformation processes country-by-country, there is general 
evidence that member states have adopted the EC rhetoric of a new problem 
definition and regarding new environmental governance. Also, in structural 
terms they participate in and have imitated some of the organisational 
innovations we observe on the EC level. According to the recent progress 
report of the fifth Environmental Action Programme, all member states have 
followed the Commission in creating organisational arrangements for policy 
integration, ranging from environmental units in other ministries (e.g., GER, 
NL, UK), inter-ministerial committees (e.g., GER, NL, UK) to sectoral 
conferences (SP). The actual impact of these organisational adaptations appears 
still weak, however (CEC 1995b: 104), most likely because they constitute 
institutional extensions more than indicate a deep institutional transformation - 
a pattern we see repeated with respect to societal structures and matters of 
policy style and instruments in the following analysis.
The Netherlands
The Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP), published in 1989, 
shows great parallels with the fifth European Environmental Action 
Programme. They share policy philosophy (problem definition) and problem 
solving approach, and differ mainly in terms of emphasis and degree. For 
instance, the Netherlands emphasises the need for "internalisation" over that of 
"integration"; hence the structure and practice of state-society relations form 
the centre piece in the Dutch strategy.
Similar to traditional EC thinking and practice, Dutch environmental policy 
used to be shaped by the notion of a trade-off between economic and 
environmental policy objectives and policy problems were identified with 
respect to concrete issues rather than within a general frame. In this light, 
mostly regulatory/legalistic measures were adopted under the political pressure 
of environmental advocates within the government who operated in an alliance 
with mobilised societal actors (Communication, Erasmus University 1996; 
Bressers 1997). But evidence of continuing policy failure, reinforced by critical 
public opinion, the Queen’s unusual intervention in her 1988 Christmas 
Address and the innovative policy making style of two subsequent ministers for 
the environment in the 1980s (Weale 1992), triggered closer cooperation 
between government and business in order to improve environmental 




























































































Case evidence suggests that new structures and modes of governance are 
crystallising in Dutch environmental policy making. The NEPP and its 
successors are shaped by the clear perception of human activity as the source 
for systemic malfunctions in the ecological system which resulted in a new 
problem solving approach focusing on the attitude and behaviour of all societal 
actors (the so-called verinnerlijking strategy). With respect to the appropriate 
choice of policy instruments, the mere imposition of legal standards seemed 
insufficient to produce the necessary educational and learning processes 
required for the effective internalisation of environmental responsibilities (Le 
Blanch 1996). Instead, target groups, convened by public authorities and 
consisting of societal actors, were formed and involved in the definition of 
policy objectives and selection of policy instruments. In these new network 
structures actors join together in order to create a public good in a way that is 
complementary with but not determined by particularistic interests (cf., Mayntz 
1993). While the traditional perception of a conflict between economic and 
environmental interests has not disappeared and the state continues to assume 
top-down steering responsibilities, Glasbergen and Driessen (1994) cite several 
examples (the Genre Valley, the Green Heart, Schiphol Airport) of relatively 
successful new governance practices, coined “network management”.7
In short, from a governance perspective the Netherlands fit the governance 
model emerging on the EC level. This is far from surprising, however, 
considering that the Netherlands were actually a front-runner in integrating new 
environmental governance features in the national system. Influenced by the 
global environmental debate which cumulated in the Brundtland report; the 
Dutch reform process preceded (in fact shaped) transformation processes on the 
EC level. Consequently, EC induced transformation pressures were minimal; at 
most, EC developments amplified ongoing national processes.
On a brief tangential note (at least with respect to this paper), the experience in 
the Netherlands raises interesting questions with respect to the future of "new 
environmental governance". Looking at the actual environmental performance
7 Much in line with the mode of modem governance described in this paper, he defines 
‘network management’ as a ‘multi-actor system, consisting of various government agencies 
and societal organizations, each carrying particular objectives and interests. These actors 
however need each other’s help to solve the [environmental] problem. Management by 
government must mobilize this multi-actor system into co-operative action, and a structured 
process of interaction and communication must be brought about. In this process, actors will 
have to learn from each other how to realise outcomes that can both bring environmental 
objectives within reach and create opportunities for those actors affected by these objectives.’ 
(Glasbergen 1994: 31, citing Zillessen et a!.,1993). The same kind of thinking is behind the 
formation of the dialogue groups on the EC level (even though they exist only on a general 




























































































in the country, ambiguities remain concerning the effectiveness of “target 
group” or “network management” for the protection of the environment. Van 
der Straaten and Hajer are leading critics of the “new” governance approach, 
pointing out that the Netherlands remains one of the most polluted countries in 
Europe and that vested industrial interests tend to prevail within the network 
structure due to the absence of commanding and sanctioning mechanisms 
(Hajer 1992, van der Straaten and Ugelow 1994). In contrast, Haverland (1997) 
traces a relatively successful packaging waste policy to new structures in state- 
industry relations and the use of self-regulatory policy instruments. But even 
here, consensus building seemed to finally depend on developing more a 
exclusive network structure than initially intended. In other words, the Dutch 
experience points critically to the often ignored evaluative questions regarding 
the impact of new governance practices on policy performance.
Germany
The policy perception and associated problem solving approaches in Germany 
show similarities with as well as differences from the understanding shared by 
the EC and the Netherlands. On the basis of the similarities in terms of problem 
perception we observe a clear approximation of the policy rhetoric in the EC 
and Germany; the persisting ideational distinctions, in turn, are reflected in the 
more selective adoption of new governance structures, styles and instruments.
To elaborate, it is not the recognition of a failure of societal actors to accept and 
take responsibility for the environmental good, but the notion that business can 
gain from activities in environmental protection that stands behind the German 
perception of “no trade-off’ between environmental and economic objectives. 
This perception finds its roots in the German regulatory tradition and its impact 
on industrial behaviour. Domestic industry was faced with challenging, that is 
technology-pushing, regulatory standards and indeed developed products and 
production processes capable of meeting these relatively high standards. 
Especially when the harmonisation of EC environmental standards took place at 
the level of German domestic standards, “clean” German industry possessed a 
comparative advantage and was able to exploit new market opportunities in the 
rest of Europe. The temporary cost of meeting environmental policy standards 
turned into long-term business opportunities and gains. Hence, the German 
problem solving approach, which developed on the basis of a recognised 
mutual dependence between economic and environmental goals, is one-sided 
and instrumental; it is not rooted in a holistic “life cycle” interpretation as in the 
Netherlands.
This perception has implication for environmental governance structure and 




























































































as society. Weidner (1996) has coined the resulting structure of state-society 
relations “ecological neo-corporatism” (okologischer Neokorporatismus) or an 
“industrial-bureaucratic environmental policy network” (industriell-
biirokratisches Umweltpolitiknetzwerk), signifying a relatively exclusive 
network structure which is innovative in its relative openness to environmental 
business interest as well as scientific experts, but offers only limited access to 
the interested public at large. The role of the state in this structure is that of an 
authoritative facilitator; i.e. operating through network contacts on the basis of 
the always present threat of command-and-control legislation (cf. also Miiller 
1989).
The overall legalistic and interventionist policy style with a preference for 
policy instruments that provide clear, material standards for public 
administration, business and the ordinary citizens is firmly rooted in the 
German state and legal tradition (van Waarden 1995, Dyson 1992) and is 
reinforced by a fragmented (federal) political structure requiring the existence 
of harmonising legislation. The constitutional character of this tradition and the 
presence of a dense legal framework already developed on its basis make 
Germany quite resistant to change.
For that reason, Germany has been slow in implementing policy instruments 
implied in “new” governance targeted at public participation and joint learning, 
that is, the introduction of “soft” regulatory measures directed at behavioural 
change, such as self-regulatory codes of conduct, as well as measures to 
improve the transparency of and access to policy making processes. Already in 
the formal transposition of EC policies representing new governance practices 
there have been problems in Germany. For instance, the latest Implementation 
Report by the Commission (CEC 1996b) speaks of conformity problems in 
Germany with the Freedom of Access to Information and the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Directives. The former Directive has been transposed into 
German law with more than one year delay and in its application poses doubts 
whether it corresponds to the spirit of the EC law (cf., Scherzberg 1994, 
Lenschow 1997). Comparing the Dutch and the Germany information strategy, 
Knoepfel and Weidner concluded more than a decade ago that the German 
system for information access which compensates restrictive assess in the 
policy formulation phase with subsequently relative open access to 
administrative courts “mainly serves the function of creating legitimacy for the 
regulatory outputs produced, while the substantially more open Dutch system is 
more appropriate for reconciling conflicting interest positions” (1983: 208). 




























































































Nevertheless, changes in governance structure, style and instruments can be 
detected in Germany. Janicke and Weidner find “changes in direction towards 
consensus building, a broader form of cooperation that includes scientists and 
members of environmental organisations critical of current environmental 
policy” as well as “modernised... instruments... stressing the role of information 
and negotiation” (1997: 140, 139). For instance eco-auditing and eco-labelling 
are seen as potentially useful complements to top-down regulation, though not 
as alternatives (see also Heritier/Knill/Mingers 1996; Knill/Lenschow 1997). 
Despite the emergence of communicative tools in the context of dispute 
resolutions (e.g., mediation) and self-regulatory instruments such as voluntary 
agreements (Rehbinder, talk at the EUI 1997), new instruments for 
environmental policy have been most extensively implemented - and 
internalised in German policy culture - where they do not conflict with the 
constitutional and administrative tradition, for instance in the area of fiscal 
policy (cf., Cremer/Fisahn 1997). Taxation measures operate within a general 
legal framework, complementing regulatory sanctions regulations with market 
correctives. They do not imply changes to administrative and state-society 
structures and procedures. While they do relieve public authorities in a context 
of an increasingly complex world that is difficult to centrally regulate, they do 
not imply adaptations to socio-political structures.
While these changes can be partly attributed to a process of domestic policy 
learning (from past policy failures), EC legislation implying market-oriented, 
self-regulatory and communicative instruments (most of them first opposed by 
Germany) seem to reinforce a growing willingness to adapt past practices 
(Interviews BMU, March 1997) and raise the potential for learning. 
Furthermore, transformation or adaptation processes must be seen in the 
context of other policy developments, that is, general efforts to de-bureaucratise 
the state. The EC regulation on environmental management and auditing 
systems, for instance, is being implemented enthusiastically (despite initial 
opposition) in part due to the promise it bears for future de-regulation 
(Lenschow 1997). This linkage between various “new” agendas continues to be 
shaped by traditional, relatively exclusive, network management in Germany, 
however, as current de-regulation measures tend to occur at the expense of 
public participation (Cremer/Fisahn 1997).
The UK
In contrast to Germany, the British traditional style of environmental policy 
making was quite different from the EC traditional patterns. Hence, the UK 
government tended to resist the regulatory measures proposed by the 
Commission, often under German influence, because the implied legalistic, 




























































































flexible British practice (Knill 1995, Weale 1997). British policy making in 
general is characterised by the absence of a strong interventionist tradition of 
the state (a “state-less society”, Nettl 1968) and the common law tradition 
which favours a case-by-case approach over universally applicable rules and 
regulations derived from fixed (constitutional) principles. Primary legislation 
establishes the administrative framework for specific regulations and standards 
which are often developed in a process of public consultation and extensive 
negotiations between public authorities and the actors to be regulated (Weale 
1997: 92). The state and the economically powerful segments of civil society 
interacted in an informal and flexible manner to find a regulatory consensus 
based on a liberal market logic; democratic control and participation through 
political channels were marginal.
Confronted with the German-influenced command-and-control legislation - 
establishing firm, material and typically emission-based standards - Britain was 
forced to augment its pragmatic, flexible policy style and “cosy” relationships 
between public authorities and industry with more formal statutory practices. 
Since the late 1980s Britain attempted to avoid such adaptation pressure by 
behaving more pro-actively in the EC policy formulation process, pushing for 
the British regulatory approach to be adopted on the EC level. The eco-label 
regulation represents one successful example (Heritier/Knill/Mingers 1996).
The new governance patterns emerging on the EC level, while sharing some 
stylistic and instrumental elements, differ significantly from the UK tradition in 
terms of the underlying problem perception and governance structures, 
however. Considering the British state and legal tradition, the notion of a 
systemic problem analysis with associated problem solving approaches that are 
being developed conceptually and applied universally is quite foreign. While 
the state may have become a more autonomous authority since the Thatcher era, 
the “clubby” state-industry relations still dominate in the environmental field; 
neither the pre- nor the post-Thatcher type of state-society relations 
corresponds with the newly envisioned structure in the EC in which the state 
plays the role of a facilitator, mediating between an inclusive set of actors with 
the goal to reach a common problem perception (internalisation) and mutually 
agreeable solutions on that basis. The British consensual and pragmatic style, 
therefore, differs from the “new” governance style in its implied market logic 
and absence of a collective “problem solving” dimension.
Nevertheless, in its rhetoric the British government has firmly adopted the 
notion of sustainable development developed in the Brundtland report 
including the implied institutional consequences. The 1990 White Paper “This 




























































































committees to pursue environmental questions (Her Majesty’s Government 
1990, cf. Weale 1997: 103). The UK strategy on sustainable development 
published in 1994 calls for the integration of environmental priorities into other 
areas of policy making and it proposes partnerships between the public and 
private actors in developing new initiatives, hence hints at problem solving 
through wider policy networks. More concretely, it announced the formation of 
a Roundtable on Sustainable Development and a citizens’ environmental 
initiative intended to improve the quality of the debate and build an 
understanding at the local level of policy issues and linkages (Christie 1994). 
The impact of these high-level, formal institutional innovations on the “deep” 
governance structure in Britain remains to be seen; their creation must be 
understood in the context of similar institutional developments, globally and in 
Europe, however.
The nevertheless limited degree of the Europe-induced transformation of 
governance in Britain becomes more apparent when analysing the choice of 
policy instruments. The shift towards market-oriented and self-regulatory 
measures in the UK is not rooted in a new belief in modem governance 
practices, based on public-private partnership relations and the recognition of a 
shared responsibility in a common good, but rather due to a domestic 
preoccupation with laissezfaire governance through market mechanisms and 
accountable government (Knill 1995) which, in turn, can be situated in the 
context of a global neo-liberal trend. The access to information policy in the 
UK similarly has its intellectual roots in an attempt to curtail discretionary state 
actions and to legitimise the conservative reform in the UK (ibid.); it was not 
intended to facilitate equal partnerships, joint learning and problem solving. In 
other words, in terms of governance style and instruments we observe a 
“merger” of the global socio-economic debate, rather than the “steering 
debate”, with themes raised by “new” environmental governance.
With respect to policy effectiveness, it needs to be the subject of future analysis 
whether similar tools based on different leading ideas show significant 
differences in their performance. On the one hand, effectiveness may result as a 
consequence of market processes. In contrast, Christie has cautioned that “so 
far development of the political culture for sustainability is on a very small 
scale, and can only be described as marginal in terms of public investment, 
political debate and public awareness” (1994; 17-18). With that statement he 
raised the question whether a formal comparison of governance structures, 
styles and instruments has any potential for leading us beyond the analysis of 
transformation processes to conclusions regarding the impact of certain 





























































































Upon entry into the EC Spain decided to incorporate all EC legislation enacted 
before 1986 into national law. Aside from quickly causing severe 
implementation problems and “administrative blockage” (Pridham 1996: 67), 
Spain effectively adopted a package of environmental regulations that was still 
characterised by the times of ad hoc, fragmented and legalistic top-down policy 
making in Brussels. This early “strategy” corresponds with the observation 
made by La Spina and Sciortino that “Southern European states generally do 
not advance proposals of their own, nor do they obstruct proposals made by 
others. This acquiescence is a way to overcome national decisional paralysis, or 
better, let the EC overcome it” (1993: 208).
With respect to the adoption of the ideational basis and institutional principles 
of modem governance since 1986, this view needs to be modified, however. 
Aguilar has characterised the present Spanish stance in EC policy making as 
“defensive”(1993: 231), especially concerning the notion of a complementary 
relation between environmental and economic policy goals and policy 
integration. Arguing severe repercussions to its economic development 
introduced by EC environmental policy, Spain has succeeded in extracting 
large sums of money from the EC budget for environmental protection, for 
instance via the Cohesion Fund (Lenschow 1997). The limited convergence on 
the level of ideas may generally hinder institutional adaptation; on the other 
hand, EC structures and instruments are more likely to be imitated where the 
national context presents a tabula rasa.
Considering that, due the recent development of the policy field, environmental 
policy institutions are hardly developed in Spain, it is not surprising that we 
observe some evidence of convergence with respect to formal institutions for 
sustainable development and modem governance (see CEC 1995). In contrast, 
the tradition of an overall governing style seems responsible for the persistence 
of the statist patterns in Spain also with respect to the new policy field - 
providing little access for civil society to the policy making process. Spanish 
environmental policy remains characterised by the “pre-eminence of public 
actors” (Aguilar 1993: 236f) controlling rather than facilitating the building of 
relatively exclusive networks with and among elements of civil society (mostly 
industry). Due to EC influence, formal contacts between government and 
industry are now increasing and voluntary “environmental pacts” have been 
created, however “[s]tate intervention and a resistance to private government 
persists...[and] the weakness of the system of interest mediation favours the 
persistence of the statist design” (ibid.: 240-1). Nevertheless, in part due to the 
Commission’s “clientelistic” policy and transnational NGO activities, an 




























































































influence Spanish and EC policy (Interviews Europe offices of WWF and 
Friends of the Earth, 1994).
The administrative structures in Spain represent the primary hindrance to cross- 
sectoral integration and problem solving in open networks. The Interministerial 
Committee for the Environment (CIMA) was dissolved in 1987, and had been 
largely ineffective in terms of facilitating policy integration before. Also the 
transformation of Spain into a “state of autonomies” with the regions taking 
over large responsibilities in environmental matters has resulted in highly 
deficient administrative co-ordination (Aguilar 1997). Conflicts on the level of 
“philosophical” issues, with the state adopting a longer term and systemic 
understanding of the environmental problématique and the regions pursuing 
shorter-term and particularistic interests, disturb state-regional relations. 
However, there is evidence that new governance signals sent from Brussels 
resonate in the economically advanced autonomous regions of Spain, such as 
Catalonia (Boerzel 1997), which are more receptive to the ideas and problem 
perception behind new governance structures and practices.
4. Conclusions: Patterns and Results of Transformation Processes
This overview of the transformation of governance structures and practices on 
the EC level and in the member states indicates change as well as continuity in 
Europe. I.e., the null-hypothesis of “no change” can be discarded, but, in the 
case of change, we observe continuing diversity in outcome on the national 
level. This confirms that aside from European transformation pressure we need 
to analyse the nature of national receptivity with respect to the dimensions of 
problem definition and institutional fit or malleability.
Despite discarding the “no change” hypothesis we could observe a good extent 
of continuity, suggesting that the necessary condition of transformation 
pressure is not fully satisfied. Indeed, with respect to new modes of 
environmental governance it is doubtful whether EC governance in the field of 
environmental policy is sufficiently comprehensive, coherent and stable to 
trigger a decisive and uniform response. Despite the leadership of some 
member states in shaping EC environmental policy, and imposing their national 
policy “paradigm” on the European level, EC policy has emerged as a 
patchwork of national styles rather than a coherent whole. The introduction of 
new governance features since the late 1980s may signify a trend, but these 





























































































Looking at the member states, we observe the clearest evidence of change at the 
level of policy rhetoric, suggesting the infiltration of common policy ideas and 
problem definitions, and with respect to small-scale institution building as well 
as the diversification of policy instruments. As argued in the beginning, this 
change in environmental rhetoric can be seen in the context of the global and 
European environmental debate as ideas circulate freely. In addition and more 
concretely, national policy programmes are formulated in compliance with 
international and EC agreements, i.e., follow substantive transformation 
pressure.
The penetration of new ideas in the “deep structure” of the European 
consciousness, or the core of the prevailing policy paradigm (Hall 1993), 
remains varied, however. In the Netherlands external impetus met with an 
already present high level of dissatisfaction with the status quo internally, 
triggering a convergence of international and Dutch problem perception even 
prior to the crystallisation of the European “environmental idea”. In Germany 
components of the newly defined environmental problématique corresponded 
with and were interpreted within the framework of a more narrowly perceived, 
already existing variant. In the UK the new environmental rhetoric appears 
symbolic and independent of a clear policy programme, fitting with the 
pragmatic national policy culture. This new rhetoric echoes the more deeply 
rooted neo-liberal paradigm in Britain, however, and we need to understand 
corresponding governance responses in that light. Finally, in Spain the new 
definition of the environmental problem, namely the notion of an economic- 
environmental win-win situation, has not been accepted. Hence the ideational 
basis for new governance structures, styles and instruments is missing.
Despite these differences on the level of problem perception, we observe 
similar institutional responses in all countries, following in many respects the 
examples set by the European Commission. Here it is important to note that 
these institutional innovations have not yet replaced, not even undermined, 
traditional organisational or interest intermediation structures; they have tended 
to be “add-ons” rather than constitute substantial reform elements. In addition 
to a certain degree of institutional imitation that seems to occur independently 
of a shared problem perception (most notably in Spain), the empirical evidence 
suggests that the direction of change signalled in Brussels has the most impact 
on governance structures and style if it corresponds with concurrent, though 
possibly independent, transformation processes on the global or the domestic 
level, such as the global debate on de-regulation or domestic moves towards 
more transparency (Knill 1997). In those cases, EC pressure for transformation 
seems to amplify ongoing transformation processes even if there has not yet 




























































































imitation in the EC is quite impressive and its impact on the long-term 
institutionalisation of ideas will be important to follow.
The dimension where we see the clearest influence of the EC on national 
patterns is on the level of policy instruments. This response makes sense from 
an institutional perspective, suggesting that policy instruments are easier to 
change than core ideas (Hall 1993). It could be equally traced to the nature of 
the transformation pressure exerted on the European level. In contrast to merely 
setting institution-building examples on the European level, legislation 
(implying the use of policy instruments) needs to be implemented on the 
national level, hence is capable of posing direct pressure for adaptation in the 
member states. Recent empirical research has shown that the shift toward a new 
structure and mode of governance (i.e., going beyond the mere use of new 
instruments) set in motion through the implementation process is mediated by 
national legal, political and administrative traditions, acting as filters in this 
transformation process (Knill 1997).
Finally, a word on the link between governance structures and policy 
performance. Experiences with different mixes of governance types in the 
member states do not provide clear evidence of their comparative capacity to 
produce solutions for environmental problems. Especially considering 
differences in national culture and socio-economic and political structure 
amongst the member states as well as differences in the type and severity of the 
policy problems, “good” governance may imply different structures depending 
on the exact situation. Hence, a wider repertoire of governance strategies rather 
than the transformation toward a uniform, new mode of governance may be 
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